Incomplete Environmental Regulation, Imperfect Competition, and Emissions Leakage by Meredith Fowlie
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
INCOMPLETE ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, IMPERFECT COMPETITION,
AND EMISSIONS LEAKAGE
Meredith Fowlie
Working Paper 14421
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14421
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
October 2008
The author gratefully acknowledges the University of California Energy Institute for financial support.
I thank Henry Shiu (UC Davis) and David Hawkins (California ISO) for granting access to industry
data.  Thanks to Jim Bushnell,  Don Fullerton, Larry Goulder, and seminar participants at the Canadian
Resource and Environmental Economics conference, Michigan State University, the National Bureau
of Economic Research, Stanford University, the Triangle Resource and Environmental Economics
seminar, the University of Michigan, and the UC\ Energy Institute POWER conference for valuable
comments. Two anonymous referees provided constructive suggestions and corrections. All remaining
errors are mine. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect
the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2008 by Meredith Fowlie. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs,
may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to
the source.Incomplete Environmental Regulation, Imperfect Competition, and Emissions Leakage
Meredith Fowlie
NBER Working Paper No. 14421
October 2008
JEL No. Q48
ABSTRACT
For political, jurisdictional and technical reasons, environmental regulation of industrial pollution
is often incomplete: regulations apply to only a subset of facilities contributing to a pollution problem.
Policymakers are increasingly concerned about the emissions leakage that may occur  if unregulated
production can be easily substituted for production at regulated firms. This paper analyzes emissions
leakage in an incompletely regulated and imperfectly competitive industry.  When regulated producers
are less polluting than their unregulated ounterparts, emissions under incomplete regulation can exceed
the level of emissions that would have occurred in the absence of regulation. Converseley, when regulated
firms are relatively more polluting, aggregate emissions under complete regulation can exceed aggregate
emissions under incomplete regulation.  In a straightforward application of the theory of the second
best, I show that incomplete regulation can welfare dominate complete regulation of emissions from
an asymmetric oligopoly.  The model is used to simulate greenhouse gas emissions from California's
electricity sector under a source-based cap-and-trade program. Incomplete regulation that exempts
out-of-state producers achieves approximately a third of the emissions reductions achieved under complete
regulation at more than twice the cost per ton of emissions abated.
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For political, jurisdictional and technical reasons, environmental regulation of industrial pollu-
tion is often incomplete: rules apply to only a subset of the sources contributing to a pollution
problem. When some ￿rms in a polluting industry are subject to market-based environmental
regulation (such as a pollution tax or pollution permit trading program) while others are exempt,
the production costs of regulated producers will increase relative to their unregulated rivals. If
unregulated production can be easily substituted for production at regulated ￿rms, emissions
reductions achieved by regulated producers may be substantially o⁄set, or even eliminated, by
increases in emissions among unregulated producers.
Regulations that tax or cap industrial greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions at the state, na-
tional or regional level are an increasingly important example of environmental regulation that
is ineluctably incomplete. There are at least two reasons for this. First, equity concerns make
complete regulation of GHG emissions broadly objectionable.1 The second reason has more to
do with the prevailing stalemate in climate policy negotiations. Political support for regulations
that aim to limit anthropogenic GHG emissions varies signi￿cantly across jurisdictions. Regional
programs, such as those recently initiated by the European Union, California, and a coalition of
Northeastern US states, are emerging in response to gridlock and policy inaction at higher levels
of governance.2
The global nature of the climate change problem creates challenges for regional initiatives. In
particular, emissions "leakage" has become a de￿ning issue in the design and implementation of
regional climate policy.3 Leakage refers to increases in production and associated emissions among
1It is generally agreed that, at least for the forseeable future, binding emissions targets should only be established
for the countries responsible for the majority of past and current GHG emissions (i.e. developed countries).
2States and regional coalitions are taking a leading role in responding to global climate change. In January
2005, the European Union Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) began operating as the largest
multi-country, multi-sector greenhouse gas emission trading scheme in the world. In December 2005, seven states
in the Northeastern U.S. signed an agreement that caps carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from power plants in the
region. In August of 2006, California passed legislation that caps greenhouse gas emissions across all sectors in the
state. A coalition of western states and Canadian provinces has also emerged to address broader regional climate
policy objectives. While some states pursue policies to address global warming, others have taken an opposite tack
and explicitly passed laws against any mandatory reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. These states include
Alabama, Illinois, Kentucky, Oklahoma, West Virginia and Wyoming. (Senate Congressional Record, October 30,
2003: S13574).
3Concerns that incomplete industrial participation will undermine the e⁄ectiveness of these regional initiatives
1unregulated producers that occur as a direct consequence of incomplete environmental regulation
(RGGI, 2007; CEC 2006). This paper develops a framework for analyzing emissions leakage in
the context of an incompletely regulated and imperfectly competitive industry.
An analysis of incomplete environmental regulation and emissions leakage should ideally re-
￿ ect the institutional realities of the industries most often targeted by incomplete environmental
regulation. The majority of emissions that are subject to regional, market-based regulations come
from industries that are often characterized as imperfectly competitive (important examples in-
clude restructured electricity markets and cement).4 Wholesale forward commitments are common
in many of these industries. Although these stylized facts play an important role in determin-
ing market outcomes, past studies analyzing the potential e⁄ects of incomplete participation in
regional climate change initiatives assume that incompletely regulated industries operate as per-
fectly competitive spot markets.5 This paper demonstrates the importance of industry structure
in determining both the extent to which leakage occurs and the welfare implications of incomplete
regulation.
A partial equilibrium model of an industry in which non-identical oligopolists compete in both
spot and forward markets is used to analyze emissions leakage. The introduction of incomplete,
market-based environmental regulation (i.e. a pollution tax or cap-and-trade program) a⁄ects
producers￿relative marginal operating costs. This has implications for aggregate production,
have plagued the design and implementation of regional programs. In Europe, the possibility that reductions
achieved domestically will be partly o⁄set by increased emissions resulting from relocation of production outside
the region has been identi￿ed as a "main concern" by stakeholders and policy makers. Stakeholders in the planning
process of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative have argued strongly that the program should not be implemented
before the leakage issue had been adequately addressed.
4Emissions from restructured electricity markets represent the majority of emissions currently targeted by re-
gional GHG cap-and-trade programs in the United States and Europe. Numerous studies provide empirical evidence
of the exercise of market power in these industries (see, for example, Borenstein et al. 2002; Bushnell et al. 2008;
Joskow and Kahn, 2002; Puller, 2007; Sweeting, 2007; Wolfram, 1999). Empirical papers that assess the implica-
tions of the exercise of market power in other energy intensive sectors targeted by these regional programs include
Ryan (2008) and Rosenbaum and Sukharoman (2001).
5See, for example, Bernstein et al. (2004), Breslow and Goodstein (2005), CEEEP (2005), Burtraw et al.
(2005). Questions about how estimated impacts of incomplete environmental regulation might change if modeling
assumptions were modi￿ed to better re￿ ect the structure of restructured electricity markets have been raised at
stakeholder workshops (RGGI Workshop on Electricity Markets, 2004; Bouttes, J.P. "Predictability in European
electricity markets." Presentation to the EU Ad Hoc Group 1. March 29, 2006), in written responses to program
analysis (Slater Consulting, "Initial Questions and Comments on the Resources for the Future report ￿ Allocations
of CO2 Emission Allowances in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Cap-and-Trade Program￿ , March 29, 2005), policy
briefs (CEC, 2005) and working papers (Wilson et al. 2005).
2relative market shares, and industry emissions. Emissions leakage is greater when emissions rates
per unit of production are high and/or when demand is more elastic. Within the context of the
model and its assumptions, the more competitive the industry, the greater the emissions leakage.
Although there is growing debate about the extent to which emissions leakage can undermine
the e⁄ectiveness of incomplete environmental regulation, it is generally assumed that incomplete
participation (and associated emissions leakage) unambiguously reduces welfare gains from envi-
ronmental regulation (CCAP, 2005; RGGI, 2007;). In a straightforward application of the theory
of the second best, I demonstrate that this need not be the case when the polluting industry is
an asymmetric oligopoly. When Cournot oligopolists with non-identical production costs exercise
market power, production is ine¢ ciently allocated across ￿rms and aggregate industry output
may fall below the social optimum. Introducing incomplete environmental regulation can miti-
gate both of these distortions (vis a vis complete regulation). Industry output under incomplete
regulation will exceed output under complete regulation. Furthermore, allocative production in-
e¢ ciencies will be reduced if the ￿rms that are exempt from environmental regulation are more
e¢ cient than their regulated counterparts. Conversely, if regulated ￿rms are more e¢ cient than
exempt producers, the introduction of incomplete regulation can exacerbate pre-existing allocative
ine¢ ciencies.
The analytical model presented in this paper serves two purposes: it is used to develop
intuition about how observable industry characteristics determine the extent to which emissions
leakage occurs under incomplete regulation, and it serves as a foundation for building more detailed
numerical models that can be used to analyze the potential for leakage in applied policy settings.
In section 5, I demonstrate how the theoretical framework can be used to inform policy design.
California is actively developing a state cap-and-trade system under the auspices of a new
state law requiring that greenhouse gas emissions be reduced to 1990 levels by 2020.6 The the-
6California￿ s Assembly Bill 32 established a statewide GHG emissions cap for 2020, based on 1990 emissions.
California is also part of the Western Climate Initiative (WCI), a collaborative of several western United States
and Canadian provinces with a goal of developing a regional strategy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. As
of October 2008, California is the only state in the WCI to be actively designing a state-level cap-and-trade
program for greenhouse gases. Allegedly, more than half half the states involved inthe Western Climate Initiative
are unlikely to ever approve the rules and regulations to allow them to actually participate in the proposed WCI
program ("Montana Inaction On GHGs May Signal Collapse Of Regional Trading Plan", September 23, 2008,
Carbon Control News).
3oretical framework is modi￿ed to re￿ ect features of California￿ s electricity market. Parameter
values are de￿ned using detailed, facility-level data. A cap-and-trade program with a ￿xed permit
price is added to the model. The potential for emissions leakage in California￿ s electricity sector,
which accounts for 23 percent of the state￿ s greenhouse gas emissions, is investigated. Equilibrium
outcomes under three scenarios are simulated: a benchmark case where CO2 emissions are unregu-
lated, a source-based cap-and-trade program regulating emissions from all electricity producers in
the western United States, and a source-based cap-and-trade program that a⁄ects only California
electricity producers.
Simulation results suggest that a complete cap-and-trade program, with an assumed price
of $25/ton of CO2, would deliver emissions reductions of 9-11 percent in the short run through
reordering the dispatch of existing production capacity. Simulations that assume California￿ s elec-
tricity producers behave strategically in the wholesale electricity market predict that incomplete
environmental regulation (i.e. a policy that regulates the emissions of only in-state producers)
would achieve 35 percent of the emissions reductions achieved under complete regulation. In
simulations that assume perfectly competitive wholesale electricity markets, this number drops
to 25 percent. The implied cost per ton of emissions reduced is more than twice as high when
participation in the environmental regulation is incomplete.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of related literature. Sec-
tion 3 introduces the theoretical framework and derives some basic theoretical results. Section
4 uses a stylized duopoly example to further illustrate the implications of the model. Section 5
demonstrates how this framework can be used to analyze leakage and related welfare e⁄ects in the
context of a regulation designed to reduce California￿ s GHG emissions. Section 6 concludes.
2 Incomplete environmental regulation of an imperfectly
competitive industry
This work is preceded by several papers in the industrial organization literature that analyze com-
plete, market-based environmental regulation of an imperfectly competitive industry. Oates and
4Strassmann(1984) consider the welfare consequences of introducing a Pigouvian tax into a monop-
olized industry. They conclude that losses in production e¢ ciency are likely to be more than com-
pensated for by welfare gains from improved environmental quality. Levin(1985), Simpson (1995),
and Van Long and Soubeyran (2005), among others, investigate second-best Pigouvian taxes.7
Others have analyzed the interaction of complete, competitive permit markets and oligopolistic
product markets (Malueg,1990; Mansur, 2007(Mansur 2007); Sartzetakis, 1997, 2004). Without
exception, this literature assumes that all producers are subject to environmental regulation. This
paper extends this body of work to the increasingly relevant case of incomplete regulation.
A second-best framework has also been used to analyze the response of public utility com-
missions to environmental regulations imposed by federal and state agencies. Earlier papers have
investigated the extent to which public utility regulators can use their limited authorities to im-
prove upon existing environmental regulations in their service territories (Burtraw et al. ,1997;
Dodds and Lesser,1994). I investigate similar themes here, albeit in the context of an imperfectly
competitive (versus economically regulated) industry.
Finally, this paper is germane to the literature that considers the linkages between pollution
regulation and comparative advantage (Baumol, 1971; Copeland and Taylor, 2003). Copeland et
al. (1994), among others, have hypothesized that an increase in the stringency of environmental
regulation will, at the margin, a⁄ect plant location decisions and international trade. Brunnermeier
and Levinson (2004) provide a review of the empirical literature that examines the e⁄ects of
environmental regulation on ￿rms￿location and investment decisions. Although earlier studies
￿nd little evidence of this so-called "pollution haven" e⁄ect, more recent studies provide some
evidence in support of this hypothesis (see, for example, Becker and Henderson, 2000; Greenstone,
1997).
Although this paper is similar to preceding work investigating the pollution haven hypothe-
sis, the application and emphasis are rather di⁄erent. Researchers analyzing interactions between
7In most cases, when producers in an imperfectly competitive industry generate a pollution externality, ￿rms￿
marginal abatement costs fall below the marginal damage from pollution at the second-best, although there are
exceptions. For example, Katsoulacos and Xepapedeas(1995) consider the case of a symmetric polluting oligopoly.
They show that if N is endogenous and there are ￿xed abatement costs, the second-best optimal tax can exceed
the marginal damage from emissions in order to discourage excessive entry.
5trade policies, environmental regulations, and the comparative advantages of di⁄erent trading
partners have tended to focus on identifying conditions under which reductions in trade barriers
can alleviate or exacerbate problems caused by pre-existing, asymmetric environmental regula-
tions. Research addressing the e⁄ects of domestic environmental regulations on plant location
and production decisions have typically ignored market structure considerations. This analysis of
emissions leakage within a single, incompletely regulated industry emphasizes strategic interactions
between asymmetric oligopolists. In this context, the introduction of incomplete environmental
regulation can either mitigate or exacerbate pre-existing ine¢ ciencies associated with the exercise
of market power in a polluting industry.
3 The Model
In this section, I investigate how the emissions and emissions leakage occurring under incomplete
environmental regulation are a⁄ected by observable industry features: operating costs, emissions
rates, regulatory participation requirements, and the degree of competitiveness. A partial equi-
librium, asymmetric oligopoly model is introduced. The model is kept intentionally simple; only
the most essential industrial features are represented. The objective here is to develop a clear,
intuitive understanding of how incomplete regulation a⁄ects ￿rm behavior in the short run.8 In
section 5, institutional details speci￿c to a particular policy context will be incorporated and some
of the more stylized assumptions are released.
8Understanding how market-based regulation a⁄ects electricity prices and asset utilization rates in the short
run is a essential ￿rst step towards understanding how these policies will a⁄ect asset values and investment in the
longer term. Furthermore, given the political momentum behind a more co-ordinated Federal (or larger regional)
climate policy, emissions leakage is arguably a more pressing concern in the near term.
63.1 The basic framework
I assume Cournot non-cooperative behavior among N strategic ￿rms.9 This is a fairly conventional
assumption. Much of the literature analyzing heavily polluting industries such as electricity and
cement employs a static oligopoly framework in which ￿rms are assumed to compete in quantities.10
Furthermore, recent empirical work suggests that ￿rm conduct in these industries is consistent with
the Cournot model.11
I ￿rst analyze a one-stage game in which ￿rms with di⁄erent production technologies compete
in a spot market. I then consider a two-stage game in which the ￿rms compete in both spot
and forward markets. This extends the work of Allaz and Vila (1993) and Bushnell (2007) to
accommodate asymmetric oligopolists.
Industrial production generates a negative pollution externality. Damages are assumed to be
independent of the location of the emissions source. Firms vary both in terms of their production
costs and emissions characteristics. Note that both kinds of asymmetry are important. A de￿ning
advantage of market-based environmental policy instruments (as compared to more traditional,
prescriptive approaches such as emissions standards) is their ability to e¢ ciently coordinate abate-
ment activity across ￿rms with non-identical abatement costs. Asymmetry in production costs
gives rise to allocative production ine¢ ciency in oligopolistic markets; this ine¢ ciency will play
an important role in determining the welfare impacts of incomplete participation.
In order to isolate the interactions between incomplete industrial participation in environ-
mental regulation and strategic behavior in the product market, several standard assumptions are
adopted. I assume that the regulator does not have the authority to regulate output distortions
9Supply function equilibrium (SFE) models are another popular option for modeling wholesale electricity markets
(see, for example, Green and Newbery, 1992; Hortascu and Puller, 2006). Willems et al. (2007) compare these
two modeling approaches using data from the German electricity market. They ￿nd that the two models perform
equally well. They suggest using Cournot models for short term analyses because market details can be more easily
accommodated.
10See, for example: Bergman and Andersson, 1995; Borenstein and Bushnell, 1999; Cardell et al, 1997; Chen and
Hobbs, 2005; Bushnell et al. 2008 ; Demailly and Quirion, 2006; Puller, 2007; Willems, 2007.
11In the past, ￿rms in industries targeted by existing and planned incomplete environmental regulation have been
able to exercise market power by restricting supply .(Borenstein, Bushnell and Wolak, 2002; Puller, 2007; Sweeting,
2007). Bushnell, Mansur, and Saravia (2008) ￿nd that a Cournot model that accounts for vertical arrangement
performs particularly well in terms of simulating observed wholesale prices in restructured U.S. electricity markets.
Puller (2007) also ￿nds that ￿rm conduct in California￿ s restructured electricity market is consistent with a Cournot
pricing game.
7directly; she takes the structure of the product market as given. Following Malueg (1990) and
Sartzetakis 2004?), I assume that ￿rms exercising market power in the product market act as
price takers in the permit market. This is an appropriate assumption provided that the industry
in question is one of several participating in the cap-and-trade (CAT) program or if regional CAT
initiatives are linked to larger international emissions permit market.12
Firms￿emissions rates per unit of production are exogenous to the model. Thus, emissions
abatement is achieved by dispatching units in a way that favors relatively clean generators rather
than via production process changes or pollution control equipment retro￿ts (Levin, 1985; Simp-
son, 1995; Mansur, 2007(Mansur 2007)).13 I make the standard assumptions that all participants
are risk neutral, all forward contracts are binding and observable, and that all prices are e¢ ciently
arbitraged (Allaz and Vila, 1993). Factor markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive. Fi-
nally, to simplify the theoretical analysis, I assume an interior solution.14 My focus is thus limited
to the short-run marginal e⁄ects of a change in environmental regulation (and thus operating
costs) on production and pollution levels when all plants are operating and none are capacity
constrained (i.e. producing at full capacity). Several of these assumptions are relaxed in the
subsequent simulation exercise.15
3.2 The one-stage game
This section introduces the one-stage model with N producers (indexed by i = 1:::N), one ho-
mogenous good Q; and one pollutant E. The ith ￿rm￿ s constant marginal production cost is given
12The EU ETS covers a variety of sectors, including electricity, iron and steel, oil and gas, building materials,
pulp and paper. Similarly, California is designing a multi-sector cap-and-trade program. There is language in both
the RGGI program and the California legislation that authorizes linking these regional markets to larger regimes,
such as the EU Emissions Trading Program. However, there are likely to be signi￿cant obstacles to establishing
these linkages in practise.
13In the case of most greenhouse gases, opportunities to reduce emissions rates of existing plants via process
changes and end-of-pipe emissions controls are very limited. The bulk of greenhouse gas reductions from the
electricity sector, in the short run, will be achieved by reorderng the dispatch of existing units so as to increase the
capacity factor at relatively clean generators (rather than from retro￿tting existing plants with pollution control
equipment). Consequently, an analysis that takes unit-level emissions rates as exogenous captures the short run
e⁄ects of environmental regulation on electricity production to a signi￿cant extent.
14This is a strong assumption. In any given hour, some generators will choose not to produce while others will
be producing at full capacity. This assumption is relaxed in the simulation exercise.
15In the simulation exercises, constant marginal costs and interior solutions are no longer assumed. A competitive
fringe is also added to the model. Section 5.2 provides a detailed description of how the simulation model di⁄ers
from the more stylized theoretical framework developed in this section.
8by C0
i(qi) = ci:16 Emissions at ￿rm i are proportional to output; Ei = eiqi: Preferences on the part
of consumers are represented by an inverse demand function P = a￿ b
N X
n=1
qi:
Suppose a regulation is introduced that requires some subset of the ￿rms in the industry to
purchase emissions permits to o⁄set their uncontrolled emissions. Permits can be bought and sold
in a competitive permit market at a price ￿. Because the permit price is determined exogenously,
the emissions trading program represented here is equivalent to a tax ￿ per unit of pollution.17
Let the variable di indicate mandatory program participation; di = 1 if the ith ￿rm is required to
comply with the environmental regulation, di = 0 if ￿rm i is exempt.
Firms are assumed to play Nash equilibrium which, conditional on my assumptions, is unique
and stable. The ith ￿rm chooses a production quantity qi to maximize pro￿ts ￿i. The vector of
production quantities q￿ = (q￿
1;:::;q￿
n) is a Nash-Cournot equilibrium for this production game if
for each i; q￿
i solves
max
qi
ps(qi;
N X
j6=i
qj)qi ￿ ciqi + di￿(Ai ￿ eiqi);
where Ai represents the initial permit allocation to ￿rm i: Assuming perfectly competitive permit
market and an interior solution implies that ￿rms￿optimal production quantities are independent
of Ai:
The equilibrium interior solution is described by the following N ￿rst order conditions:
ps(Q) + p
0
s(Q)qi = ci + di￿ei 8 i = 1;::;N:
Conditional on demand parameters a and b, permit price ￿, and cost and emissions rate
vectors c and e; the Nash-Cournot equilibrium ￿rm-level and aggregate production quantities can
16Note that each ￿rm is associated with a single constant marginal cost production technology (versus a portfolio
of production technologies).
17In this analysis, electricity sector emissions are endogenously determined whereas the permit price is an assumed
value. As noted above, this is an appropriate approach when the industry of interest is small relative to the larger
permit market (such that changes in industry emissions do not signi￿cantly a⁄ect the equilibrium permit price).
In an extension of the analysis presented here; Bushnell (forthcoming) imposes a cap on electricity sector emissions
and allows the permit price to be determined endogenously.
9be written as functions of the vector of participation indicators d :
q
￿
i1(d) =
a +
N X
i=1
(ci + ￿diei) ￿ (N + 1)(ci + ￿diei)
(N + 1)b
(1)
Q
￿
1(d) =
1
(N + 1)b
 
Na ￿
N X
n=1
ci ￿ ￿
N X
n=1
diei
!
(2)
These equilibrium conditions are derived in Appendix 1. The subscript 1 indicates that these
prices, quantities and aggregate emissions correspond to the equilibrium in the single stage model.
In the following, I omit the asterisks.
3.2.1 Emissions and Emissions Leakage in the One-Stage Game
Emissions leakage is de￿ned as the di⁄erence between the emissions of unregulated ￿rms under in-
complete environmental regulation, and emissions of these ￿rms when no environmental regulation
is in place. By [1], leakage can be written:18
L1 =
N X
i=1
(1 ￿ di)ei
0
B B
B B
@
N X
i=1
￿diei ￿ (N + 1)￿diei
(N + 1)b
1
C C
C C
A
(3)
=
N1N0
(N + 1)b
￿ e1 e0; (4)
where e1 is the average emissions rate among regulated producers and e0 is the average emissions
rate among unregulated producers: N1 and N0 represent the number of regulated and exempt
producers, respectively:
N X
n=1
di = N1 ;
N X
n=1
(1 ￿ di) = N0:
18A derivation of this expression is included in Appendix 1.
10A marginal increase (decrease) in the average emissions rate of regulated or unregulated ￿rms
has a positive (negative) e⁄ect on leakage. The more elastic demand, the smaller the value of
b, the greater the emissions leakage. Finally, note that an increase in industry concentration
decreases emissions leakage, all else equal. Intuitively, if the product market is more competitive,
a given ￿rm￿ s market share will be more signi￿cantly a⁄ected by a regulation-induced change in
relative marginal operating costs (inclusive of compliance costs), and the regulation-induced shift
in emissions will be more substantial.
I turn now to a comparison of equilibrium output and emissions under three di⁄erent regu-
latory regimes: a benchmark case in which no environmental regulation is present (i.e., di = 0 for
all i = 1:::N), the complete participation case (where di = 1 for all i = 1:::N), and the incomplete
participation case where di 6= dj for some i 6= j: Let the superscripts B; COMP, and INC de-
note these three equilibria, respectively. Results are summarized by four propositions. Proofs are
presented in Appendix 2.
Proposition 1 QB > QINC > QCOMP
This follows directly from Equation [2]. Assuming that ￿ > 0 and that ei > 0 for at least
one regulated ￿rm, the introduction of environmental regulation will increase average marginal
operating costs (inclusive of compliance costs) in the industry relative to the benchmark case. This
induces a decrease in aggregate production. This e⁄ect is greater when participation is complete.
Proposition 2 Complete regulation unambiguously reduces aggregate emissions.
This also follows from Equation [2]. It is worth noting that this result contradicts Levin (1985) who
￿nds that a uniform Pigouvian tax imposed on all producers in a Cournot oligopoly can increase
industry emissions. For this outcome to arise, the second derivative of the inverse demand function
must be very large (implying extreme curvature). In assuming linear demand, the possibility of
increased industry emissions is ruled out.
11Proposition 3 If e0 > e1, the introduction of incomplete environmental regulation can result in
a net increase in overall emissions.
It is possible for emissions leakage to exceed the reduction in emissions achieved by regulated ￿rms.
The following summarizes the conditions under which the introduction of incomplete regulation
will increase industry emissions (derived in Appendix 2):
e2
1
e ￿ e1
<
N
N + 1
(5)
The numerator, the sum of the square of the emissions rates of regulated producers, cannot be
less than the square of the mean of these emissions rates. Thus, in order for this inequality to be
satis￿ed, the average emissions rate among non-participating ￿rms must be signi￿cantly greater
than the average emissions rate among regulated ￿rms.
Proposition 4 If e1 > e0 ; aggregate emissions under complete environmental regulation can
exceed aggregate emissions under incomplete regulation.
Emissions under complete participation will exceed emissions under incomplete participation if
the following inequality holds:
e2
0
e e0
<
N
N + 1
(6)
The somewhat counter-intuitive result will only be observed when regulated ￿rms are relatively
more polluting. The introduction of the environmental regulation into a Cournot oligopoly mar-
ket changes ￿rms￿relative operating costs and redistributes market share towards ￿rms whose
relative costs have decreased. If the ￿rms exempt from the incomplete regulation are cleaner, this
reallocation of production may result in lower overall emissions when participation is incomplete.
Consequently, incomplete regulation can result in industry emissions that are less than what they
would be under complete regulation.19
19If inequality [6] is satis￿ed and emissions under complete regulation exceed emissions under incomplete reg-
ulation, leakage will still occur. Put di⁄erently, production levels and emissions will increase among unregulated
producers, but the net reduction in industry emissions will be greater than that achieved by complete regulation.
123.3 The Two-Stage Game
In this section, a forward product market is added to the model. Vertical arrangements are common
in several of the major industries currently targeted by incomplete environmental regulation. The
e⁄ect of forward contract positions on spot market outcomes has attracted particular attention in
the context of restructured electricity markets ( Bushnell et al, 2008; Wolak et al., 2000). In the
dialog surrounding the design and implementation of regional climate policies, policy makers and
industry stakeholders have questioned how the introduction of incomplete regulation could a⁄ect
the forward contract positions taken by regulated and unregulated ￿rms, and thus the patterns of
emissions (RGGI Workshop on Electricity Markets, 2004; Wilson et al. 2005).
Following Allaz and Vila (AV), I ￿rst derive equilibrium conditions for the spot market pro-
duction game and then nest that equilibrium outcome in a two-period model in which ￿rms can
sell product forward in the ￿rst period. Production occurs in the second period spot market. For
technical simplicity, I continue to assume an interior equilibrium. Su (2007) proves the existence
of a forward market equilibrium in the more general case where producers have nonidentical cost
functions and an interior solution is not assumed.
3.3.1 The Spot Market Production Game
Conditional on forward contract positions f, N producers with nonidentical marginal costs ci
engage in Cournot competition in the electricity spot market. The ith ￿rm chooses a level of
production qi to maximize pro￿ts:
max
qi
(
ps(qi;
N X
j6=i
qj)(qi ￿ fi) ￿ ciqi + di￿(Ai ￿ eiqi)
)
If the ith producer has already sold fi in the forward market, she sells only qi ￿ fi in the spot
market; revenues from the sales of forward contracts are excluded from the spot market production
stage pro￿t function. Consequently, when the ￿rm is short on the forward market (i.e. fi > 0) it
will be less sensitive to the price elasticity e⁄ect of increasing production.
The vector of production quantities q￿ = (q￿
1;:::;q￿
n) is a Nash-Cournot equilibrium for the
13spot market production game if for each i = 1;::;N; q￿
i solves:
max
qi
￿i
(
ps(qi;
N X
j6=i
q
￿
j)(qi ￿ fi) ￿ ciqi + di￿(Ai ￿ eiqi)
)
: (7)
Assuming an interior solution (i.e. qi > 0 8 i ) implies the following ￿rst order conditions for an
equilibrium:
p
0
s(Q)(qi ￿ fi) + ps(Q) = ci + ￿diei 8 i = 1;::;N: (8)
For a given set of demand parameters a and b, cost vector and emissions rate vectors c and e;
and a permit price ￿, the Nash-Cournot equilibrium for the spot market production stage game
is characterized by:
qi(f) =
a +
X
j6=i
(cj + ￿djej) ￿ N(ci + ￿diei ￿ bfi) ￿ b
N X
j6=i
fj
(N + 1)b
(9)
Q(f) =
N
(N + 1)b
 
a ￿
1
N
N X
n=1
ci ￿
￿
N
N X
n=1
diei +
b
N
N X
i=1
fi
!
(10)
Proof. See Appendix 3.
Note that the quantity supplied by ￿rm i in the spot market is increasing in fi and decreasing in
fj. If the ￿rm has taken a more aggressive forward position, the returns to withholding production
(and thus raising the equilibrium spot price) are reduced. This is the basic intuition behind the AV
result that strategic ￿rms￿ability to sell forward (in the absence of any risk) has a pro-competitive
e⁄ect on spot market outcomes.
3.3.2 The Forward Contract Market
Following AV, I assume that trading in a forward market occurs one period before production
takes place. In this ￿rst stage, ￿rms simultaneously choose their forward position fi . Speculators
take the opposite position, purchasing the aggregate forward quantity F. Assuming the forward
14positions of the other ￿rms are ￿xed, the ith producer chooses fi to maximize:
max
fi
￿i
￿
￿[(ps(fi; ￿ F_i) ￿ ci ￿ ￿diei)qi(fi;F_i) + ￿Ai] + [pf ￿ ￿ps(fi;F_i)] fi
￿
; (11)
where ￿ is the rate at which spot market returns are discounted in the ￿rst stage. Rational
expectations are assumed, which means that both ￿rms and speculators correctly anticipate the
e⁄ect of forward market contracting on the spot market equilibrium (i.e. pf = ￿ps): The vector
of forward contract quantities f￿ = (f￿
1;:::;f￿
n) is a Nash forward market equilibrium if for each
i = 1;::;N; f￿
i solves:
max
qi
n
￿[(ps(fi;F
￿
_i) ￿ ci ￿ ￿diei)qi(fi;F
￿
_i)] + ￿Ai
o
(12)
Allaz and Vila show how one can solve for a forward market Nash equilibrium in closed-
form when demand and cost functions are a¢ ne and duopolists have identical cost functions.
Su (2006) establishes an existence theorem for the forward market equilibrium when producers
have non-identical cost functions by reformulating the forward market equilibrium problem as an
equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints. Building on this previous work, I solve for a
forward market interior Nash equilibrium in closed form for a general number of oligopolists with
non-identical cost functions.
For a given set of demand parameters a and b and cost vector c, the Nash equilibrium outcome
in the forward market can be characterized as follows:
f
￿
i =
(N ￿ 1)a
(N2 + 1)b
+
(N2 ￿ N + 1)(1 ￿ N)
(N2 + 1)b
(ci + ￿diei) +
(N ￿ 1)N
(N2 + 1)b
X
j6=i
(cj + ￿djej); (13)
q￿i2(d1;::dN) =
Na + N2X
j6=i
(cj + ￿djej) ￿ N(N2 ￿ N + 1)(ci + ￿diei)
(N2 + 1)b
(14)
Q
￿
2(d1;::dN) =
N
(N2 + 1)b
(Na ￿
N X
n=1
ci ￿ ￿
N X
n=1
diei) (15)
These equilibrium conditions are derived in Appendix 4. The 2 subscript indicates that these
15prices and quantities correspond to the equilibrium in the two stage model where ￿rms compete
in both forward and spot markets.
3.3.3 Emissions and Emissions Leakage in the Two-Stage Game
The following expression de￿nes emissions leakage in the two period model:
L2 =
N1N0N2
(N2 + 1)b
￿ e1 e0: (16)
It is straightforward to demonstrate that Propositions 1-4 hold qualitatively when ￿rms com-
pete in both spot and forward product markets. Appendix 5 proves these results for the two-stage
model.20 A comparison of [16] and [ 3] implies the following:
Proposition 5 The existence of a forward market increases emissions leakage.
Firm-level production and relative market shares are more responsive to relative changes in
the marginal costs of production when ￿rms can sell product forward. In this sense, the presence
of forward contracts has the same e⁄ect on emissions leakage as a decrease in product market
concentration. The presence of a forward market implies a more competitive product market and
greater emissions leakage.
3.4 Perfectly competitive markets and corner solutions
In analyzing the e⁄ect of market structure on emissions leakage, it is instructive to consider a
perfectly competitive industry as a reference case. If price-taking (versus strategic) behavior is
assumed for all ￿rms, and if the assumptions of constant marginal operating costs, heterogeneous
operating costs, and non-binding capacity constraints are maintained, the competetive equilibrium
will be a corner solution (i.e. the least cost ￿rm(s) will supply the entire market and relatively
high cost ￿rms will produce nothing). Consequently, this informal investigation of the perfectly
competitive case admits corner solutions.
20Some of these results do di⁄er quantitatively across the one and two-stage models. For example, in the two
stage model, a broader range of parameter values imply increasing emissions under incomplete participation.
16Consider a perfectly competitive market supplied by the ￿rm with the lowest production costs.
Environmental regulation will have no impact on aggregate emissions if the identity of the least cost
producer is una⁄ected by the introduction of the regulation. Similarly, there will be no emissions
leakage if the identity of the least cost producer is una⁄ected by the degree of participation in
the environmental regulation. Converseley, if the identity of the least cost producer changes with
the introduction of environmental regulation, the e⁄ect on aggregate emissions can be dramatic
as all production activity shifts from a ￿rm with a relatively high emissions rate to a ￿rm with
relatively low emissions. Similarly, emissions leakage can be signi￿cant if the identity of the least
cost producer depends on the degree of participation.
In summary, whereas an increase (decrease) in the level of industry competitiveness will
increase (decrease) emissions leakage when only interior solutions are considered, the relationship
between industry competitiveness and emissions leakage becomes more ambiguous when corner
solutions are admitted.
4 A stylized example
I now consider the simple duopoly case in order to clarify the key results derived above and
to illustrate the welfare implications of incomplete participation in market-based environmental
regulation. Here I assume that the duopolists have emissions rates ehigh and elow, respectively
(where emissions rates measure the quantity of pollution emitted per unit of output; elow < ehigh).
The ith ￿rm￿ s marginal cost of producing electricity is given by C0
i(qi) = ci; i = low; high: Firms
face demand P(qlow + qhigh) = a ￿ bqlow ￿ bqhigh. Within this simple framework, equilibrium
conditions are analyzed under four di⁄erent regulatory regimes. In the benchmark case, emissions
are unregulated. Under complete regulation, both ￿rms are obliged to pay ￿ per unit of pollution
they emit. Under incomplete regulation, only one of the ￿rms is subject to the regulation.
174.1 Analysis of Emissions and Emissions Leakage
Figure 1 plots the best response functions of the duopolists in the single-stage game. The positive
domain of the horizontal and vertical axes measure the production quantities of the low and high
￿rms, respectively. The ￿rms￿emissions rates (elow and ehigh) are measured on these axes below
and to the left of the origin, respectively.
The solid, downward sloping lines represent best response functions in the benchmark case:
The intersection of these lines (point A ) de￿nes equilibrium production quantities when emissions
are unregulated. The broken lines represent the best response functions under complete regula-
tion. Complying with the environmental regulation increases the marginal production costs at
both ￿rms, shifting both best response functions towards the origin. Note that the best response
function of the relatively dirty ￿rm shifts towards the origin by relatively more. The intersec-
tion of these broken lines (point B) de￿nes the equilibrium production quantities under complete
environmental regulation.
With only two ￿rms, there are two possible forms of incomplete environmental regulation.
Point C de￿nes equilibrium production levels when only the relatively clean ￿rm is required to
participate. Point D identi￿es the equilibrium quantities under the second scenario when only the
￿rm with the relatively high emissions rate is subject to the regulation. Note that the best response
function of the unregulated ￿rm is una⁄ected by the introduction of incomplete regulation.
Emissions and emissions leakage can be measured in terms of the rectangular areas labeled F
through L. Complete environmental regulation reduces emissions by J ￿ G: If only the relatively
clean ￿rm is subject to the regulation, emissions leakage (equal to area I) exceeds the emissions
reductions at the regulated ￿rm (equal to area F). Figure 1 depicts a case where the introduction
of incomplete environmental regulation results in a net increase in emissions relative to the bench-
mark case when the regulated ￿rm is relatively clean. Note that, for this to occur, inequality [5]
must be satis￿ed.
If only the relatively more polluting ￿rm is subject to the regulation, emissions reductions at
the regulated ￿rm (J + K) signi￿cantly exceed leakage (G + H). Consistent with Proposition 4,
aggregate emissions under complete participation exceeds incompletely regulated emissions. Note
18that this will only occur when the regulated ￿rm is relatively clean and [6] holds.
Figure 2 plots the best response functions of the same duopolists competing in both spot and
forward markets. Introducing a forward market to the model shifts the best response functions of
both ￿rms away from the origin. The intersection of the solid lines (point A) de￿nes equilibrium
production in the absence of environmental regulation.
The broken lines in Figure 2 de￿ne best response functions both duopolists under complete
regulation. The introduction of the complete regulation a⁄ects the equilibrium forward positions
of both ￿rms. As a consequence, the best response function of the relatively less (more) polluting
￿rm shifts in by relatively less (more) as compared to the previous example where ￿rms compete
in spot markets only. The e⁄ect of complete environmental regulation on aggregate emissions is
ampli￿ed. Complete regulation reduces overall emissions by P ￿ M:
The dotted lines in Figure 2 represent the best response functions under incomplete regu-
lation that exempts the relatively more polluting ￿rm. Contrary to the single-stage model, the
best response function of the unregulated ￿rm is a⁄ected by the introduction of the incomplete
regulation. By [13], the increase in the regulated ￿rm￿ s marginal operating costs will induce the
unregulated ￿rm to increase its forward position, hereby shifting qHIGH(qLOW) away from the
origin. The incomplete regulation a⁄ects the best response function of the regulated ￿rm in two
ways. First, the regulation-induced increase in marginal operating costs shifts the ￿rm￿ s best
response function towards the origin. Second, by [13], the regulated ￿rm will reduce its forward
position, thus shifting its best response function further towards the origin. The combination of
these e⁄ects results in more emissions leakage than would have occurred had ￿rms competed in a
spot market only. In Figure 2, leakage is represented by area O.
4.2 Welfare implications of incomplete regulation
Now consider the problem faced by a social welfare maximizing regulator. For expositional clarity,
I adopt the simplest possible welfare measure. Welfare is de￿ned to be the gross consumer bene￿t
from consumption less production costs less monetized damages from emissions. This assumes
that the regulator is indi⁄erent to purely redistributional e⁄ects and weights all welfare impacts
19equally, regardless of the jurisdiction in which they accrue.21 To further simplify, I assume that
marginal damages are constant and equal to the prevailing permit price ￿:22
The regulator￿ s objective function can be written:
W(d1;d2) =
Q(d1;d2) Z
0
D(s)ds ￿
2 X
i=1
ciqi(d1;d2) ￿ ￿
2 X
i=1
eiqi(d1:d2):
Suppose that jurisdictional, political, or technical constraints limit the reach of this regulator
such that ￿rm 2 cannot be required to participate in the environmental regulation. The regulator
will only want to introduce the incomplete regulation if doing so improves welfare. The net
welfare e⁄ect of introducing incomplete regulation can be obtained by subtracting W(0;0) from
W(1;0) and rearranging:
W(1;0) ￿ W(0;0) =
QCOMP Z
QB
P(s)ds +
￿
3b
(e1(3c1 ￿ 2c)) +
￿2
3b
(3e
2
1 ￿ 2e1e): (17)
Requiring ￿rm 1 to purchase permits to o⁄set its emissions a⁄ects overall welfare via three di⁄erent
channels, each corresponding to one of the three arguments in [17]. The ￿rst argument measures
the change in gross consumer bene￿t from consuming Q. The second measures the change in
overall costs that results from both a change in industry production levels and a reallocation of
production across duopolists. The ￿nal argument measures the change in monetized damages from
emissions.
With regard to the ￿rst argument, aggregate production is unambiguously reduced under
incomplete regulation (assuming that the permit price is strictly positive and e1 > 0). This
regulation-induced reduction in overall output can be associated with a decrease in average pro-
duction costs (net of environmental compliance costs) if the unregulated ￿rm has relatively low
production costs. Conversely, if ￿rm 2 is the relatively less productively e¢ cient ￿rm, the intro-
duction of incomplete regulation can exacerbate the allocative production ine¢ ciencies resulting
21An alternative approach could de￿ne welfare as a weighted sum of producers￿and consumers￿surplus, with less
(or zero) weight ascribed to costs and bene￿ts accruing to agents outside the jurisdiction imposing the regulation.
22In this example, all factor markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive. If inputs to production were taxed,
this could introduce tax interaction e⁄ects with signi￿cant welfare implications. These are not considered here.
20from the exercise of market power. Thus, the second argument can be either positive or nega-
tive, depending on the relative emissions rates and production costs of participating and exempt
producers.
The e⁄ect of incomplete regulation on aggregate emissions (and thus damages) will depend on
the relative emissions rates of the regulated and unregulated producers. Although the introduction
of incomplete regulation will most likely reduce industry emissions in equilibrium, if the unreg-
ulated ￿rm is more polluting than the regulated ￿rm, it is possible that damages could increase
under incomplete regulation.
Figure 3 illustrates how forward contracts, ￿rms￿emissions rates, and the degree of regulatory
participation together determine net welfare impacts within this simple framework. To generate
these ￿gures, the emissions rate of the unregulated ￿rm has been normalized to 1. The marginal
production costs of ￿rm 2 are assumed to be less than those of ￿rm 1. This implies that the
introduction of incomplete regulation will mitigate pre-existing allocative ine¢ ciencies by raising
the production costs of the relatively less e¢ cient ￿rm.23
The left panel plots environmental regulation induced welfare changes as a function of the
emissions rate of ￿rm 1 in the single-stage game. The solid line plots the welfare change induced
by incomplete regulation (as de￿ned by equation [16]). The broken line plots the welfare e⁄ects
of complete regulation relative to the benchmark case (i.e. W(1;1) ￿ W(0;0)). Note that the
introduction of complete regulation decreases welfare over a large range of e1values. The welfare
costs induced by the regulation (i.e. further contraction of industry output and, when e1 < e2, an
exacerbation of pre-existing allocative production ine¢ ciency) overwhelm the bene￿ts associated
with a reduction in industry emissions. If the assumed damages per unit of emissions were to
increase, welfare changes induced by complete regulation would be strictly positive over a larger
range of e1. For su¢ ciently large values of ￿, the introduction of complete regulation will be
welfare improving for all values of e1 .
23Parameter values used to generate these ￿gures are: a = 80;c1 = 1;c2 = 3;e2 = 1;b = 1;￿ = 10:These parame-
ter values are not meant to be representative of any particular policy scenario. This example is used to illustrate
simple theoretical relationships between ￿rms￿relative emissions rates, the degree of regulatory participation, and
welfare. A more realistic simulation model is introduced in section 5.
21In the example depicted by Figure 3, incomplete regulation welfare dominates complete reg-
ulation over a wide range of values of e1. Intuitively, incomplete regulation will welfare dominate
complete regulation if the bene￿ts of excluding ￿rm 2 from the regulation (namely higher levels
of industry production and more e¢ cient allocation of production across ￿rms) exceed the costs
(namely, the damages associated with emissions leakage). The range of e1 over which incomplete
regulation welfare dominates would decrease (increase) if ￿ were to increase (decrease) because
this increases (decreases) the costs of incomplete participation. An increase (decrease) in c2 would
increase (decrease) the bene￿ts of incomplete participation vis a vis complete participation.
Welfare implications of introducing complete and incomplete regulation into the two-stage
model are illustrated by the right panel. As compared to the one-stage model, complete regulation
welfare dominates incomplete regulation over a broader range of e1: Furthermore, the range of e1
for which either regulation is welfare increasing has increased. Because of the pro-competitive
e⁄ects of forward contracts, the pre-existing product market distortions are less severe in the two-
stage model. Consequently, the potential gains from mitigating allocative production e¢ ciencies
through the introduction of incomplete regulation that exempts the relatively more e¢ cient ￿rm
are reduced.
5 Assessing the potential for leakage in California
The theoretical framework developed in the previous sections provides some basic intuition about
how observable features of an industry (such as emissions rates, operating costs, and industry
structure) can a⁄ect both emissions leakage and overall welfare. However, these theoretical models
are too abstract to be applied directly in an analysis of a particular policy. In this section, I
demonstrate how the theoretical framework can modi￿ed so as to facilitate a more realistic and
detailed policy analysis under alternative assumptions about ￿rm conduct.
Leakage has become a de￿ning issue in the debate over how California should curb GHG
emissions from electricity generation (Climate Action Team, 2005; CCAP, 2005; CEC, 2005).
Regulation passed in California in 2006 mandates a 25 percent reduction in state-wide GHG emis-
sions by 2020. Ideally, California would regulate all electricity producers supplying the California
22market. Constitutional law and other jurisdictional limitations make this impossible. Legisla-
tors anticipate that the emissions leakage associated with an emissions trading program for only
in-state producers would be substantial.24
In many respects, the theoretical framework developed in the previous section is particularly
well suited to this application. Past research has demonstrated how the exercise of market power
during peak hours has signi￿cantly a⁄ected outcomes in California￿ s electricity industry (Boren-
stein, Bushnell and Wolak, 2002; Joskow and Kahn, 2001; Bushnell et al. 2007; Puller, 2007).25
Moreover, theoretical and empirical analysis of restructured wholesale electricity markets indi-
cates that the extent of forward contracting by suppliers has been an important determinant of
equilibrium outcomes in restructured electricity markets (Bushnell et al., 2005; Chen and Hobbs,
2005; Wolak, 2000). Finally, the suite of generation technologies used to produce electricity mar-
ket is very heterogeneous. This gives rise to signi￿cant variation in operating costs, operating
constraints, and emissions rates across producers.
Detailed data from California and surrounding states (Arizona, Nevada, New Mexico, Ore-
gon, Utah, Washington) are used to parameterize three numerical models based on the theoretical
framework developed in the previous section: a one-stage model of oligopolists facing a compet-
itive fringe, a two-stage model in which ￿rms choose both spot market production and forward
contract positions to maximize pro￿t, and a model that assumes perfect competition. The one-
stage Cournot model represents an upper bound on the extent to which market power could be
exercised in this market, whereas the perfectly competitive case represents a lower bound. An in-
vestigation of outcomes under both extremes helps to de￿ne the range of possible emissions leakage
outcomes, conditional on observed technology characteristics, ownership structure, demand pat-
terns, etc. Conditional on ￿rms being able to sell product forward, the two-stage model de￿nes
24California is currently working with other states and Canadian provinces, under the auspices of the Western
Climate Initiative (WCI) to develop a regional GHG emissions reduction strategy. However, California is the only
state in the WCI that is actively developing a cap-and-trade system. (CARB, 2008; CCAP, 2005; CEC, 2005; CEC,
2008).
25Technical rigidities on the supply side (including transmission constraints and the prohibitively high costs of
storing electricity) and a lack of short run demand response (due to limited real time metering and the nature
of the commodity) make it impossible to rely exclusively on competitive markets to balance supply and demand.
Designing perfectly competitive wholesale markets for electricity has proved di¢ cult. Even where the market
structure seems conducive to competition (i.e. ownership of generation assets is not concentrated and access to
transmission capacity is not limited), market power can be exercised at particular locations or times.
23the theoretical upper bound on the supply function equilibria.
Three regulatory scenarios are considered: (1) no regulation of GHG emissions (the baseline
case); (2) a scenario in which all producers must purchase permits to o⁄set uncontrolled emissions
(i.e. complete market-based regulation); (3) market-based regulation of GHG emissions from
California generators.26 In these simulations, as in the theoretical model, the permit price is
assumed (versus determined endogenously).
5.1 Modifying the model to re￿ ect the realities of California￿ s elec-
tricity market
To carry out the simulation exercises, the theoretical framework is modi￿ed in several important
ways. First, some of the simplifying assumptions that were made to keep the theoretical analysis
tractable cannot reasonably be maintained in this applied exercise. Constant marginal costs and
interior solutions are no longer assumed. Equilibrium production quantities are those that max-
imize producer pro￿ts subject to unit-level capacity constraints, major transmission constraints,
and assumed native load service obligations.
I assume perfectly inelastic demand in the short run. Electricity demand tends to be highly
inelastic in the short run because few consumers have incentives to respond immediately to ￿ uc-
tuations in wholesale prices. Furthermore, the ￿rms that procure customers￿electricity in the
wholesale market are mandated to provide the power at any cost. The simulation model can
be modi￿ed to accomodate some demand response. Appendix 7 explores how simulation results
change when demand elasticity is incorporated into hourly simulations.
Finally, a competitive fringe is added to the simulation model. In general, restructured
26Scenarios (2) and (3) encompass the range of possibilities under the "￿rst-deliverer" program design that is
being pursued in California. If all emissions from imports can be e⁄ectively traced back to sources located in
non-participating jurisdictions, the ￿rst-deliverer design is equivalent to complete participation. The incomplete
regulation scenario represents the other extreme: a scenario in which it is not possible to charge deliverers for
the emissions associated with their imports. If California proceeds unilaterally with its proposed suite of state-
level policies, the outcome would likely fall somewhere in between these two extremes. Regulations precluding
long term contracts with relatively dirty out-of-state sources, protocols to measure out of state emissions, and
other institutional factors would mitigate leakage to some extent. However, practical di¢ culties associated with
accurately tracking and measuring emissions from imports makes complete elimination of the leakage problem
unlikely.
24wholesale electricity markets are served by a group of dominant ￿rms and a fringe of smaller,
price taking suppliers. If demand is perfectly inelastic, any production that is strategically with-
held by dominant producers will be replaced with fringe production. The presence of the fringe
has important implications for emissions leakage and overall e¢ ciency.27 To the extent that the
introduction of environmental regulation increases the fringe market share, the regulation will
exacerbate allocative production ine¢ ciencies.
5.2 Data
The following sections describe the data used in the simulations. A detailed description of how
the simulations were carried out is included in Appendix 6.
5.2.1 Generation Ownership
The analysis uses equity ownership as of January 2005. Plant ownership information from EIA
Form 860 was checked against 2004 SEC 10K ￿lings and a data set compiled by the Natural
Resources Defence Council (2004).28 Table 1 summarizes ownership of generation installed in the
western states. Any generating capacity belonging to a parent company owning less than 2000
MW of fossil-fuelled generation is aggregated into a non-strategic, price-taking fringe. Ownership
of the generating facilities operating in these states is shared by 341 ￿rms. The eleven strategic
￿rms own over half of the electricity generating capacity in California.
5.2.2 Imports and Load Serving Obligations
California control operators are required to report and classify metered electricity ￿ ows across Cal-
ifornia￿ s borders. The California Energy Commission (CEC) assumes that all electricity generation
that is owned or under contract by California utilities is used to meet California demand.29 Pro-
27Mansur (2008) demonstrates how the exercise of market power in the PJM electricity market reduced overall
emissions (relative to perfect competition) because fringe ￿rms in PJM are relatively less polluting on the margin,
as compared to dominant ￿rms. In California, the reverse is more likely; the marginal fringe unit is more likely to
be relatively more polluting.
28In cases where data was inconsistent across sources, the SEC ￿lings were used.
29This approach may overestimate California imports. There may be hours when some of this out-of-state coal
generation is used to serve native load.
25duction at these facilities is classi￿ed as "￿rm imports". Appendix 8 lists the out-of-state capacity
owned by California utilities. This generation plus known, long-standing contracts constitute ￿rm
imports.30
Total imports less ￿rm imports are classi￿ed as "state" imports. State imports are grouped
into two source regions: Paci￿c Northwest (PNW) and Southwest (SW). Electricity supply and
demand in Washington and Oregon is used to represent PNW. Electricity supply and demand in
Arizona, Nevada, New Mexico, and Utah is aggregated to represent the SW region. I assume that
out-of-state generation not owned by California utilities is obliged to supply native load before it is
made available to California. States surrounding California have not restructured their respective
electricity industries. I assume that generation in these states is dispatched to minimize costs.
5.2.3 Load
All control areas must report hourly electrical load to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) as part of their Form No. 714 (FERC-714) reporting requirements.31 Hourly loads
reported by electric utility control and planning areas in California and surrounding states in 2004
(the most recent data available) are used in the simulations.32
5.2.4 Major Interstate Transmission Capacity Constraints
Transmission congestion limits the amount of electricity that can be imported into California in
some hours. These constraints have implications for leakage. Transmission constraints limiting
the ￿ ow of imports into California from neighboring states are represented crudely by the capacity
constraints imposed by the two major interstate transmission paths. Path 66 connects northern
California and Oregon. Upgrades in 2001 increased the transmission capacity of this path to 5,400
MW. Path 46 connects Southern Nevada and Arizona to Southern California. The total Path 46
30In 1985 SDG&E and PGE entered into an agreement for the purchase of 75 MW of capacity from PGE￿ s
Boardman Coal Plant from January 1989 through December 2013. SDG&E pays a monthly capacity charge plus a
charge based upon the amount of energy received. California utilities also contract with the Western Area Power
Administration for approximately 2000 GWh of hydro power annually.
31The FERC-714 is authorized by the Federal Power Act and is a regulatory support requirement as provided
by 18 CFR § 141.51.
322004 was described by the California Energy Commission and the California ISO as a year of "average weather
conditions" in the state (CEC et al. 2005).
26system has a maximum capacity of 10,118 MW.
5.2.5 Generation Capacity Constraints
Generation capacity constraints are imposed at the boiler level. Installed capacities of thermal
and nuclear generating units (denoted MWi) are adjusted to re￿ ect seasonal changes in operating
conditions and the probability that the unit will be unavailable in any given hour. Thermal
unit capacity is derated to re￿ ect summer operating conditions.33 The North American Electric
Reliability Council (NERC) tracks unit availability and outages at over 91% of installed capacity
in North America.34 These data are used to estimate unit-level forced outage factors fi . For each
unit, dependable capacity is calculated as DMWi = MWi (1 ￿ fi):35
5.2.6 Hydro, Nuclear, and Renewable Generation
A signi￿cant share of California￿ s gross system power is generated using large hydro, nuclear, and
renewable generation assets.36 Nuclear generation units are treated as must-run and must-take
resources in the wholesale market simulations. Renewable generation capacity is discounted using
GAR data and other available estimates of average resource availability.
Monthly hydro generation data are available for all hydro units in all states. Hourly hydro
generation data for 2004 were obtained from the California Independent System Operator (ISO).
The monthly data from California are used to calculate month-speci￿c percentages measuring the
share of total hydro generation accounted for by hourly ISO data. These percentages are used
to scale up the hourly hydro generation data.37 I assume that hydro generation dispatch will be
una⁄ected by the introduction of a cap-and-trade program for GHG emissions. Hydro generation
in surrounding states is only used to serve California demand if it is not required to meet native
33The summer derate capacity can range from 90 to 96 percent of nameplate capacity based on the type of unit
and location.
34These data are compiled annually and reported in the Generating Availability Report (GAR).
35Alternatively, Monte Carlo simulation methods could be used to simulate forced outages (see Borenstein,
Bushnell and Wolak, 2002). This approach is di¢ cult to implement in this context, where equilibria of a two-stage
game is solved for in each hour. The approach taken here is similar to that adopted by Bushnell, Mansur and
Saravia(2008).
36It is estimated that in 2005, large hydro, nuclear and renewable generation accounted for 17 percent, 14 percent
and 11 percent of gross system power, respectively (CEC, 2006).
37On average, the California ISO hourly data represents two thirds of state hydro generation.
27load obligations.
5.2.7 Marginal Operating Costs
Unit-level marginal operating costs consist of three components: variable fuel costs, variable non-
fuel operating and maintenance costs, and variable environmental compliance costs. Fuel costs
(measured in $/MWh) are calculated by multiplying a unit￿ s reported heat rate by the correspond-
ing fuel costs (reported in FERC form 423). I make the standard assumption that 20 percent of
non-fuel, non-rent, non-compliance operating and maintenance costs are variable.38 Finally, for
thermal units subject to the Acid Rain Program and/or the RECLAIM Program, variable environ-
mental compliance costs are calculated by multiplying a unit￿ s reported emissions rate (measured
in lbs/MWh) by the average pollution permit price in 2004.
CO2 emission rates are estimated at the boiler level. All thermal electricity generating units
over 25 megawatts must continuously monitor and report hourly CO2 mass emissions, heat inputs,
and steam and electricity outputs to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.39 Hourly, boiler-
level data are used to estimate CO2 emissions rates when available. For smaller units that do
not report hourly CO2 emissions, technology speci￿c estimates of emissions rates for California
producers reported in CEC (2005a) are assumed.
5.2.8 Permit Price
Simulations assume a permit price of $25/ton CO2. Tol (2007) reviews 103 estimates of monetized
damages per ton of carbon dioxide. He reports mean damages of $25 per ton of carbon dioxide
(although he argues that true damages are unlikely to exceed $14 per ton). This value is also
representative of observed prices in the largest operating carbon market (the EU ETS). The
average price per ton of CO2 in the EU market was $24.30 in 2007.
38This is the assumption made by Platts and RDI.
39In a few instances, emissions reported in the hourly data were implausibly large or small. The CO2 emissions
depends on the amount of carbon that the original fuel contains. When reported emissions deviated signi￿cantly
from expected emissions (based on reported heat rates, output, and fuel btu content), emissions were imputed
based on fuel-speci￿c emissions rates.
285.3 A Preliminary look at the data
Figures 4, 5, and 6 summarize the emissions, marginal operating costs, and load data for Cal-
ifornia, the Paci￿c Northwest (Washington and Oregon) and Southwest (Arizona, Nevada, New
Mexico, and Utah). To construct these ￿gures, generating units within each region are arranged in
ascending order of marginal operating cost (i.e. variable fuel costs, variable operating and main-
tenance costs, and variable costs of complying with SO2 and NOx regulations where applicable).40
The monotonic step function in the top panel of each ￿gure traces out an aggregate marginal cost
curve for each region. The bar graphs behind these marginal cost curves represent the emissions
rates (measured in lbs of CO2/MWh) corresponding to each unit.41 For each region, a distribution
of hourly load is also constructed using the 8784 realizations of hourly load in each region in 2004.
These distributions are displayed in the lower panel of each ￿gure.
Comparing the two panels helps to illustrate the extent to which the di⁄erent regions rely
on imports.42 Of all three regions, supply is tightest in Califoria. In hours when California￿ s
demand for out-of-state imports is high, it is likely that demand in neighboring states will also be
high because hourly electricity demand in California is positively and signi￿cantly correlated with
hourly demand in the Southwest and Northwest (correlation coe¢ cients for 2004 hourly load are
0.89 and 0.58, respectively). Taken together, Figures 4, 5, and 6, and regional load correlations
suggest that, in hours of high demand, the marginal unit in California hours could easily be more
polluting than the marginal out-of-state unit.
5.4 Simulation results
Hourly electricity production at generating units in California and six neighboring states (Arizona,
Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington), hourly imports, hourly wholesale electricity
40Data from out-of-state units owned by California utilities are used to generate the California ￿gure.
41In California (￿gure 4), considerable hydro and renewable generation is represented by the zero or very low cost
generation with zero CO2 emissions. Out-of-state plants owned by California utilities are included in this ￿gure.
These coal units correspond to the low cost units with high emissions rates (to the left of the ￿gure). Figures
5 and 6 represent the SW and PNW regions, respectively. The low cost units with high CO2 emissions rates in
the Southwest are all coal-￿red. Figure 6 illustrates substantial hydro resources in the PNW region. Both ￿gures
illustrate that both regions have the capacity to export power to California in most hours.
42Installed capacity measures (versus dependable capacity) are used to generate these ￿gures.
29prices, and hourly emissions are simulated under all three policy scenarios, under all three sets of
assumptions regarding ￿rm conduct. This section discusses these results in detail.
5.4.1 The Benchmark Case
Before turning to the results from the counterfactual policy simulations, it is instructive to compare
the outcomes we actually observed in 2004 (when no CO2 regulation was in place) with the
simulation results generated using models that assume no CO2 emissions regulation. Over 8784
hours, the average wholesale electricity price associated with the two-stage simulation model is
within one percent of the observed average price. As expected, prices simulated using the single-
stage model (i.e.that assumes a less competitive spot market) are higher than observed prices (
by approximately 3 percent on average). Simulations that assume a perfect competitive wholesale
electricity market yield an average wholesale electricity price that is three percent below the
observed average.
The last three rows of table 3 summarize simulated and observed emissions. Simulated emis-
sions associated with California load (i.e. emissions from both in-state generation and imports)
are within 1 percent of estimated emissions. The two-stage Cournot model performs the best
in terms of predicting emissions that most closely approximate Caifornia Energy Commission￿ s
estimates. In these simulations, the average emissions rate of the marginal fringe ￿rm is 1.08 lbs
CO2=kWh, exceeding the average emissions rate of the marginal unit operated by a strategic ￿rm
(0.91 lbs/kWh).
All three simulation models overpredict total emissions (summed across all Western states)
by a considerable margin (i.e 12 percent). Discrepancies between simulated emissions and those
estimated by the California Energy Commission or the Energy Information Administration are
likely attributable to several factors. First, assumptions about emissions from small units and
hourly hydro generation (particularly outside of California) may not re￿ ect the realities in any
given hour. These inaccuracies can result in inaccurate estimates of equilibrium prices and emis-
sions. The simulation model also does not account for intertemporal operating constraints which
can result in generators being willing to operate when prices are below marginal costs, or being
30unable to operate at full capacity when price exceeds marginal costs.43 Finally, it is worth noting
that the "observed" numbers reported by the EIA and CEC are by no means exact measures. In
particular, emissions outside of California are somewhat crudely measured.
In summary, observed prices and emissions are most consistent with the two-stage model that
assumes strategic behavior on the part of the largest producers. These ￿ndings are consistent with
past empirical studies of California￿ s wholesale electricity market which ￿nd that observed market
prices exceed the competitive benchmark (Borenstein et al. 2002; Bushnell et al. 2008; Puller,
2007). Although the exercise of market power is one possible explanation, there are a number of
institutional factors that could explain the relatively poor ￿t of the competitive model.44 A more
rigorous investigation of ￿rm conduct in this electricity market is beyond the scope this analysis.
In the interest of characterizing a range of possible outcomes, counterfactual policy simulations
are conducted using all three simulation models.
5.4.2 Counterfactual Policy Scenarios
Results from the counterfactual policy simulations are summed across hours to estimate total
emissions and production costs over a calendar year (2004). Table 3 provides a numerical summary
of the results generated using the one-stage Cournot model, the two-stage Cournot model, and
the model that assumes price taking behavior on behalf of all producers.
The introduction of environmental regulation (assuming a permit price of $25/ton) signi￿-
cantly impacts wholesale electricity prices. As expected, the resulting increase in wholesale elec-
tricity price is greater (in absolute and percentage terms) in simulations that assume a less compet-
itive electricity market. In simulations that assume dominant ￿rms behave strategically, complete
regulation delivers an 8.5 percent reduction in total emissions. Incomplete regulation achieves 35
percent of these emissions reductions. The simulation model that assumes price taking behavior
on behalf of all producers yields somewhat di⁄erent results. The e⁄ect on wholesale electricity
43Mansur (2008) demonstrates how the competitive benchmark approach to measuring market power in electricity
markets will overstate actual welfare losses if intertemporal operating constraints (and other non-convexities) are
ignored.
44For example, intertemporal operating constraints are not represented in this model. Mansur (2008) demon-
strates that ignoring production constraints that result in non-convex costs can lead to in￿ ated estimates of the
degree to which market power is being exercised.
31prices is relatively small. Complete regulation delivers emissions reductions of over 11 percent. In-
complete regulation achieves only 25 percent of the emissions reductions achieved under complete
regulation.
Recall that, in imperfectly competitive product markets, incomplete environmental regulation
can potentially mitigate pre-existing allocative production ine¢ ciencies if exempt facilities employ
relatively more e¢ cient (or less costly) production technologies. Figure 7 illustrates that, in this
case, incomplete regulation leads to less e¢ cient production. To construct this ￿gure, the variable
operating costs of meeting inelastic demand are computed in all hourly simulations. These costs
include fuel costs and operations and maintenance costs, but do not include the costs of purchasing
permits to o⁄set CO2 emissions. The hourly cost data generated using the two stage simulation
model are plotted against hourly load. Flexible polynomial functions are ￿t to these data, sum-
marizing how the average cost per MWh produced varies with load in the absence of regulation
(the solid line), under complete regulation (the broken line), and under incomplete regulation (the
dotted line). Intuitively, because the competitive fringe is disproportionately comprised of out-
of-state producers, the fringe market share is greater under incomplete regulation. This implies
higher average production costs under incomplete regulation.
Finally, simulated costs and emissions can be used to calculate the cost per ton of CO2
reduced. To do this, operating costs (excluding the cost of complying with CO2 regulation)
are summed across producers, across hours under complete environmental regulation, incomplete
environmental regulation, and in the absence of regulation. Aggregate variable operating costs
in the absence of regulation are then subtracted from aggregate variable operating costs under
environmental regulation. This di⁄erence represents the costs of dispatching more costly (but
lower emitting) units in order to achieve emissions reductions. To compute the average abatement
cost, I divide total abatement cost by the total emissions reductions. In the simulation models
that assume strategic behavior, the average cost per ton of abatement under complete regulation
is approximately $31. This cost increases to $78 under incomplete regulation. The average cost
per ton of emissions reduced under perfect competition is below $6. This average abatement cost
increases to $80 per ton under incomplete regulation.
326 Concluding remarks
Incomplete industrial participation in market-based environmental regulation has the potential
to signi￿cantly undermine policy e⁄ectiveness. This paper develops a theoretical framework for
analyzing emissions leakage, and associated welfare implications, in an incompletely regulated,
imperfectly competitive industry.
Several key results emerge from a theoretical analysis of the partial equilibrium model. First,
industry structure can play an important role in determining the extent to which emissions leakage
occurs. The more competitive the industry, the greater the e⁄ect of incomplete participation
on industry emissions (assuming interior equilibria). The relative emissions rates at regulated
versus unregulated facilities also matters. If regulated ￿rms are cleaner than their unregulated
counterparts (and unregulated production can be easily substituted for regulated production),
industry emissions will exceed the emissions that would have occurred under complete regulation.
Conversely, if regulated ￿rms are dirtier than their unregulated rivals, industry emissions under
complete participation can exceed emissions under incomplete participation.
The net welfare e⁄ects of incomplete participation depend not only on the extent to which
emissions leakage occurs, but also on how incomplete regulation a⁄ects industry production in
aggregate, and the regulation-induced reallocation of production among heterogeneous producers.
There are two potential sources of welfare gains from introducing environmental regulation into an
imperfectly competitive market: those associated with reduced emissions, and those potentially
achieved through a reallocation of production that favors more e¢ cient producers. These are
weighed against the welfare costs associated with reduced output and the potential to exacerbate
pre-existing allocative ine¢ ciencies. If exempt producers are more (less) e¢ cient relative to their
regulated rivals, the introduction of incomplete environmental regulation will mitigate (exacerbate)
pre-existing allocative production ine¢ ciencies.
Detailed data from California￿ s electricity industry are used to analyze the implications of in-
complete participation in a state-level, market-based regulation that aims to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions from electricity consumption in the state. A numerical model that can accommodate
strategic behavior in California￿ s wholesale electricity market, forward contracts, and heteroge-
33neous production technologies is used to simulate CO2 emissions under a complete cap-and-trade
program and a cap-and-trade program that only applies to in-state generators. Assuming a permit
price of $25/ton of CO2, results indicate that complete regulation of an imperfectly competitive
electricity sector would reduce total emissions by 8 percent in the short run . This number in-
creases to 11 percent if the electricity market is assumed to be perfectly competitive. Simulation
models that assume an imperfectly competitive electricity market predict that incomplete regu-
lation would achieve 35 percent of the emissions reductions achieved under complete regulation.
This number drops to 25 percent if competitive electricity markets are assumed. In all cases con-
sidered, costs per ton of CO2 emissions reduced are signi￿cantly lower under complete regulation
as compared to a regulation that exempts out-of-state producers.
34Figure 1 : The One-stage Duopoly Game
Notes: This ￿gure plots the best response functions of duopolists competing in a spot market. The
positive domain of the horizontal and vertical axes measures output at the relatively more polluting and
less polluting ￿rm, respectively. Emissions rates (measured in units of pollution per unit of output) are
measured in the negative domain. The solid lines correspond to best response functions in the absence
of environmental regulation. Broken lines represent best responses when environmental regulation is in
place. Emissions leakage under incomplete regulation that exempts the relatively more polluting ￿rm
is represented by area I. Emissions leakage under incomplete regulation that exempts the relatively less
polluting ￿rm is equal to area G+H.
35Figure 2 : The Two-Stage Duopoly Game
Notes: This ￿gure plots the best response functions of duopolists competing in both spot and forward
markets. The positive domain of the horizontal and vertical axes measures output at the relatively more
polluting and less polluting ￿rm, respectively. Emissions rates (measured in units of pollution per unit of
output) are measured in the negative domain. The solid lines correspond to best response functions in the
absence of environmental regulation. Broken lines represent best responses when complete environmental
regulation is in place. Best response functions under environmental regulation that exempts the relatively
dirty ￿rm are represented by the dotted lines. Leakage is equal to area O.
36Figure 3 : Welfare E⁄ects of Complete and Incomplete Regulation
Notes: This ￿gure illustrates how welfare changes following the introduction of both complete and incom-
plete environmental regulation. The left panel plots welfare changes under the single-stage model. The
right panel corresponds to the two-stage model. To generate these ￿gures, parameter values are de￿ned
as follows: a=80; c1=3; c2=1; e2=1; b=1; t=10.
37Figure 4 : Marginal Costs, CO2 Emissions Rates, and Hourly Load in California
Notes: The monotonic step function in the upper ￿gure traces out the marginal operating costs of
generating units in California arranged in ascending order of operating cost per MWh. These costs
include fuel, variable operating and maintenance costs, and marginal costs of complying with NOx and
SO2 regulations in 2004. The bars in the upper panel represent the corresponding, unit-speci￿c CO2
emissions rate (measured in lbs of CO2 per MWh). The bottom panel represents the distribution of
hourly electricity demand in California in 2004.
38Figure 5 : Marginal Costs, CO2 Emissions Rates, and Hourly Load in the Southwest
Notes: The monotonic step function in the upper ￿gure traces out the marginal operating costs of gener-
ating units in the Southwest (AZ, NV, NM, UT) arranged in ascending order of operating cost per MWh.
These costs include fuel, variable operating and maintenance costs, and marginal costs of complying with
NOx and SO2 regulations in 2004. The bars in the upper panel represent the corresponding, unit-speci￿c
CO2 emissions rate (measured in lbs of CO2 per MWh). The bottom panel represents the distribution
of hourly electricity demand in these four Southwesters states in 2004.
39Figure 6 : Marginal Costs, CO2 Emissions Rates, and Hourly Load in the Northwest
Notes: The monotonic step function in the upper ￿gure traces out the marginal operating costs of gen-
erating units in the Paci￿c Northwest (WA and OR) arranged in ascending order of operating cost per
MWh. These costs include fuel, variable operating and maintenance costs, and marginal costs of com-
plying with NOx and SO2 regulations in 2004. The bars in the upper panel represent the corresponding,
unit-speci￿c CO2 emissions rate (measured in lbs of CO2 per MWh). The bottom panel represents the
distribution of hourly electricity demand in these two Northwestern states in 2004.
40Figure 7 : Average Operating Costs per MWh under Factual and Counterfactual
Policy Scenarios
Notes: These are ￿ exible polynomial functions ￿t to simulated hourly operating costs (summed across all
generators supplying California) plotted versus California load. These ￿gures summarize results generated
using the two-stage model. The solid line plots average costs in the absence of environmental regulation.
The broken line represents average costs under complete regulation. The dotted line represents average
costs under incomplete regulation. Note that the dotted line lies everywhere above the broken line.
Production is allocated less e¢ ciently under incomplete (versus complete) environmental regulation.
41Table 1: Ownership of Generators in California and Surrounding States: January
2005
Parent Company Total % Total % California total % Average
(exluding hydro) Fossil (MW) emissions rate
(MW) (MW) (exluding hydro)
(lbs CO2=kWh)
Calpine Corp. 7,700 5.0 6,210 6.8 6,181 9.5 0.85
Edison International 7,744 4.8 4,196 4.6 5,294 7.7 1.32
Pinnacle West 7,407 4.8 6,180 6.7 0 0 1.31
Paci￿c Gas & Electric 6,564 4.2 557 0.6 6,564 10.1 1.30
Duke Energy Corp. 5,493 3.5 5,493 6.0 4,293 6.6 1.32
Berkshire Hathaway 5,280 3.4 4,152 4.5 92 0.1 1.21
AES Corp. 4,650 3.0 4,437 4.8 4,631 7.1 0.83
Reliant Energy Inc. 4,187 2.7 4,187 4.6 3637 5.6 1.24
Sierra Paci￿c Resources 3,780 2.5 3,769 4.2 25 0.0 1.81
Mirant Corp. 2,875 1.9 2,875 3.1 2,300 3.5 1.06
UniSource Energy Corp. 2,310 1.5 2,306 2.5 0 0 1.11
Other 97,353 63 47,261 52 30,020 50 1.19
Total 155,168 91,747 65,134 1.21
Notes: This table summarizes electricity generating capacity ownership by parent company. A signi￿cant
portion of the "other" capacity is comprised of public power, including generation owned by the Western
Area Power Administration, Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, and the Salt River Project.
Remaining generation is owned by "fringe" ￿rms, de￿ned here to be ￿rms owning less than 2.5 percent
of total fossil generation.
42Table 2: Summary of Equilibrium Prices and Emissions in the Absence of CO2
Regulation
(standard deviations in parentheses)
Observed One stage Two-stage Competitive
(2004) model model model
Average
California $46.71 $48.31 $46.26 $45.40
electricity price ($7.12) ($8.73) ($8.34) ($8.29)
($/MWh)
California emissions 55.2￿ 52.1 52.8 52.7
(million tons CO2)
Emissions from generation 118.7￿￿ 119.4 118.7 118.1
supplying California
(million tons CO2)
Total emissions 206.4￿ 232.2 231.5 231.0
(million tons CO2)
￿ These estimates are taken from the Energy Information Administration state pro￿les for 2004.
￿￿ This estimate is taken from the Inventory of California Greenhouse Gas Emission and Sinks: 1990 to
2004 (California Energy Commission, Oct. 2006). The report estimates that CO2 emissions from instate
generationin 2004 were 51.85 million tons. GHG emissions from electricity imports are estimated to be
approximately 66.8 million tons. Note that the CEC estimate of California￿ s emissions is substantially
less than the EIA estimate.
43Table 3: Summary of Equilibrium Permit Prices and Emissions Under Complete and
Incomplete Regulation
(price standard deviations in parentheses)
Single-stage model Two stage model Perfect Competition
Complete Incomplete Complete Incomplete Complete Incomplete
Regulation Regulation Regulation Regulation Regulation Regulation
Average $74.76 $71.45 $69.58 $66.47 $64.10 $63.96
California ($11.94) ($10.35) ($11.06) ($10.57) ($15.38) ($10.89)
electricity price
($/MWh)
Emissions from generation 54.0 32.2 55.1 34.6 50.1 34..7
located in California
(millions of tons)
Emissions from generation 109.2 112.4 108.6 111.9 101.3 111.4
serving California load
(millions of tons)
Total emissions 212.5 225.3 211.8 224.7 204.6 224.3
(million tons CO2)
Total reduction 19.7 7.0 19.7 6.8 26.4 6.7
(million tons CO2)
Total reduction 8.5% 3% 8.5% 2.9% 11.4% 2.9%
(%)
.
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48Appendix 1: Deriving Equilibrium Conditions and Leakage in the One-Stage Game
The ith ￿rm maximizes the pro￿t function:
￿i = ps(Q)qi ￿ ciqi + ￿(Ai ￿ dieiqi):
First order conditions for a maximum are given by:
ps(Q) + p0
s(Q)qi ￿ ci ￿ di￿ei = 0:
Summing across N yields:
Nps(Q) ￿ bQ ￿
N X
i=1
ci ￿ ￿
N X
i=1
diei = 0:
Dividing through by N yields:
ps(Q) ￿
b
N
Q ￿ ￿ c ￿ ￿de = 0;
where ￿ c = 1
N
N X
i=1
ci; de = 1
N
N X
i=1
diei.
Substituting for p(Q) and simplifying yields and expression for Q￿:
Q￿
B =
N
(N + 1)b
(a ￿ ￿ c ￿ ￿de):
First order conditions for a maximum can also be manipulated to derive q￿
i :
bq￿
i = ps(Q￿) ￿ ci ￿ di￿ei
Substituting for Q￿ we have:
bq￿
i = a ￿
0
B B
B B
B
@
N
(N + 1)
0
B B
B B
B
@
a ￿
N X
i=1
ci
N
￿ ￿
N X
i=1
diei
N
1
C C
C C
C
A
1
C C
C C
C
A
￿ ci ￿ di￿ei
q￿
iB =
a +
N X
j6=i
(cj + ￿djej) ￿ N(ci + ￿diei)
(N + 1)b
Leakage in the single stage model is de￿ned to be:
49L =
N X
i=1
(1 ￿ di)ei(qINC
i ￿ q0
i )
=
N X
i=1
(1 ￿ di)ei
0
B
B B
B B
@
N X
i=1
￿diei ￿ (N + 1)￿diei
(N + 1)b
1
C
C C
C C
A
=
N X
i=1
(1 ￿ di)ei
￿
￿N1e1
(N + 1)b
￿
= N0e0
￿
￿N1e1
(N + 1)b
￿
Appendix 2
Proof of proposition 2.1 : Complete regulation unambiguously reduces aggregate emissions
N X
i=1
ei
0
B
B B
B B
@
a +
N X
i=1
(ci + ￿ei) ￿ (N + 1)(ci + ￿ei)
(N + 1)b
1
C
C C
C C
A
<
N X
i=1
ei
0
B
B B
B B
@
a +
N X
i=1
ci ￿ (N + 1)ci
(N + 1)b
1
C
C C
C C
A
:
N X
i=1
ei
 
N X
i=1
￿ei ￿ (N + 1)￿ei
!
< 0
N2(e)2 < (N + 1)Ne2
￿e2 < N(var(ei))
This proves that aggregate emissions under complete regulation will be strictly less than unregulated
emissions.
Proof of Proposition 3.1 :If e0 > e1, the introduction of incomplete environmental regulation can
result in a net increase in overal emissions.
50N X
i=1
ei
0
B
B B
B B
@
a +
N X
i=1
(ci + ￿diei) ￿ (N + 1)(ci + ￿diei)
(N + 1)b
1
C
C C
C C
A
>
N X
i=1
ei
0
B
B B
B B
@
a +
N X
i+1
ci ￿ (N + 1)ci
(N + 1)b
1
C
C C
C C
A
N X
i=1
ei
 
N X
i=1
￿diei ￿ (N + 1)(￿diei)
!
> 0
Nee1 > (N + 1)e2
1
N
N + 1
>
e2
1
e e1
If the exempt ￿rms are su¢ ciently more polluting, this inequality can be satis￿ed.
Proof of Proposition 4.1: If e1 > e0 ; aggregate emissions under complete environmental regulation
can exceed aggregate emissions under incomplete regulation.
This proposition implies:
N X
i=1
ei
N X
i=1
diei ￿
N X
i=1
ei
N X
i=1
ei < (N + 1)
 
N X
i=1
eidiei ￿
N X
i=1
eiei
!
e2
0
e e0
<
N
N + 1
In order for this inequality to hold, it must be that e0 > e, (i.e. regulated ￿rms are relatively more
polluting).
Appendix 3: Equilibrium Conditions in the Spot Market Production Stage
Given the vector f, the ￿rm maximizes the spot market production game pro￿t function:
￿s
i = ps(Q)(qi ￿ fi) ￿ ciqi + ￿(Ai ￿ dieiqi): (18)
First order conditions for a maximum are given by:
p0
s(Q)(qi ￿ fi) + ps(Q) ￿ ci ￿ ￿diei = 0: (19)
51Summing across N ￿rms yields:
Nps(Q) ￿ bQ + b
N X
i=1
fi ￿
N X
i=1
ci ￿ ￿
N X
i=1
diei = 0:
Dividing through by N yields:
ps(Q) ￿
b
N
Q +
b
N
N X
i=1
fi ￿ ￿ c ￿ ￿de = 0;
where ￿ c = 1
N
N X
i=1
ci;; de = 1
N
N X
i=1
diei.
Substituting for p(Q) and simplifying yields and expression for Q(F):
Q(F) =
N
(N + 1)b
 
a ￿ ￿ c ￿ ￿de +
b
N
N X
i=1
fi
!
First order conditions for a maximum can also be manipulated to derive qi(fi;F_i):
bqi = (a + bfi ￿ bQ(F) ￿ ci)
Substituting for Q(F) :
N
bqi = a + bfi ￿ ci ￿
N
(N + 1)
 
a ￿ ￿ c ￿ ￿de +
b
N
N X
i=1
fi
!
qi(fi;F_i) =
a +
X
j6=i
(cj + ￿djej) ￿ N(ci + ￿diei ￿ bfi) ￿ b
N X
j6=i
fj
(N + 1)b
Appendix 4: Deriving Equilibrium Conditions in the Forward Market
In order to choose a forward contract level, ￿rm i evaluates:
￿i = ￿[(ps(fi;F￿i) ￿ ci ￿ ￿diei)qi(fi;F￿i) + ￿Ai]
=
￿
(N + 1)2b
 
a ￿ ci ￿ Nci + N￿ c ￿ ￿diei ￿ N￿diei + N￿de ￿ b
X
i
fi
!
0
@a ￿ ci + N￿ c ￿ Nci ￿ ￿diei + N￿de ￿ b
X
j6=i
fj + Nbfi
1
A
52First order conditions for a maximum imply:
￿
(N + 1)2b
0
B
B
@
Nb(a ￿ ci ￿ ￿diei ￿ N(ci + ￿diei) +
X
i
(ci + ￿diei) ￿ b
X
i
fi)￿
b(a ￿ ci ￿ ￿diei +
X
i
(ci + ￿diei) ￿ N(ci + ￿die) ￿ b
X
j6=i
fj + Nbfi)
1
C
C
A = 0
Solving for fi :
fi =
(N ￿ 1)
0
@a +
N X
i=1
(ci + ￿diei) ￿ b
X
j6=i
fj
1
A + (1 ￿ N2)(ci + ￿diei)
2Nb
In the symmetric cost case, this system can be easily solved for an arbitrary N :
f =
(N ￿ 1)(a ￿ c ￿ ￿de ￿ b(N ￿ 1)f)
2Nb
f￿
i =
(N ￿ 1)(a ￿ c ￿ ￿de)
(N2 + 1)b
Solving the system of N equations implied by the nonidentical marginal cost case is more di¢ cult:The
system can be rewritten as:
fi +
N ￿ 1
2N
X
j6=i
fj =
N ￿ 1
2Nb
 
a +
N X
i=1
(ci + ￿diei)
!
+
(1 ￿ N2)(ci + ￿diei)
2Nb
;
which can in turn be rewritten as follows:
2
6
6 6
4
1 :: :: N￿1
2N
: 1 :
: 1 :
N￿1
2N :: :: 1
3
7
7 7
5
f =
N ￿ 1
2Nb
 
a +
N X
i=1
(ci + ￿diei)
!
￿ +
(1 ￿ N2)
2Nb
mc;
where f is the vector [f1::::fn]T; mc is the vector of marginal costs [c1 + ￿d1e1;:::;cN + ￿dNeN] and ￿ is
the vector [1::::1]T:
This implies:
f =
2
6 6
6
4
1 :: :: N￿1
2N
: 1 :
: 1 :
N￿1
2N :: :: 1
3
7
7 7
5
￿1
￿
 
N ￿ 1
2Nb
 
a +
N X
i=1
(ci + ￿diei)
!
￿ +
(1 ￿ N2)
2Nb
mc
!
:
Note:
532
6 6
6
4
1 :: :: N￿1
2N
: 1 :
: 1 :
N￿1
2N :: :: 1
3
7 7
7
5
=
N + 1
2N
I +
2
6 6
6
4
N￿1
2N :: :: N￿1
2N
: :
: :
N￿1
2N :: :: N￿1
2N
3
7 7
7
5
=
N + 1
2N
I +
N ￿ 1
2N
￿￿T
=
N + 1
2N
￿
I +
N ￿ 1
N + 1
￿￿T
￿
Substituting back into our original system, we have:
￿
I +
N ￿ 1
N + 1
￿￿T
￿
f =
2N
N + 1
 
N ￿ 1
2Nb
 
a +
N X
i=1
(ci + ￿diei)
!
￿ +
1 ￿ N2
2Nb
mc
!
￿
I +
N ￿ 1
N + 1
￿￿T
￿
f =
N ￿ 1
(N + 1)b
 
a +
N X
i=1
(ci + ￿diei)
!
￿ +
1 ￿ N2
(N + 1)b
mc
From Henderson and Searle(1981) we have:
(A + buv0)￿1 = A￿1 ￿
b
1 + bv0A￿1u
A￿1uv￿1A￿1;
where u is a column vector and v is a row vector. This implies:
￿
I +
N ￿ 1
N + 1
￿￿T
￿￿1
= I ￿
N￿1
N+1
1 + N(N￿1
N+1)
￿i0
=
￿
I ￿
￿
N ￿ 1
N2 + 1
￿
￿i0
￿
=
2
6
6 6
4
N2￿N+2
N2+1 :: :: ￿
(N￿1)
N2+1
: :
: :
￿
(N￿1)
N2+1 :: :: N2￿N+2
N2+1
3
7
7 7
5
:
Substituting this matrix into our original system of equations:
f =
2
6
6 6
4
N2￿N+2
N2+1 :: :: ￿
(N￿1)
N2+1
: :
: :
￿
(N￿1)
N2+1 :: :: N2￿N+2
N2+1
3
7
7 7
5
 
N ￿ 1
(N + 1)b
 
a +
N X
i=1
(ci + ￿diei)
!
￿ +
1 ￿ N2
(N + 1)b
mc
!
:
54This implies:
fi =
(N ￿ 1)a + (N2 ￿ N + 1)(1 ￿ N)(ci + ￿diei) + (N ￿ 1)N
X
j6=i
(cj + ￿djej)
(N2 + 1)b
Having solved for fi in terms of the parameters N;a;b and the vector mc we can now solve for qi by
substituting this expression into the to the equation de￿ning equilibrium quantity from the production
stage game:
qi =
a ￿ N(ci + ￿diei) +
X
j6=i
(cj + ￿djej) ￿ b
X
i
fi + (N + 1)bfi
(N + 1)b
qi =
Na ￿ N(N2 ￿ N + 1)(ci + ￿diei) + N2X
j6=i
(cj + ￿djej)
(N2 + 1)b
To solve for Q￿
i; we sum across q￿
i :
Q￿ =
N2(a ￿ c ￿ ￿de)
(N2 + 1)b
p￿ =
a + N2 ￿
c + ￿de
￿
(N2 + 1)
Finally, ￿rm-level and aggregate emissions in equilibrium are:
eiqiF =
Naei ￿ N(N2 + 1)(ciei + ￿die2
i) + N2
N X
i=1
ei(ci + ￿diei)
(N2 + 1)b
EF =
N X
i=1
eiqi =
N2e(a + N2c + N2￿de) ￿ N(N2 + 1)
N X
i=1
￿
eici + ￿die2
i
￿
(N2 + 1)b
Appendix 5: Proof of propositions 1- 4 when ￿rms trade forward
Proof of proposition 2.2 : Complete regulation unambiguously reduces aggregate emissions
55N X
i=1
ei
0
B B
B B
B
@
Na + N2
N X
i=1
(ci + ￿ei) ￿ N(N2 + 1)(ci + ￿ei)
(N2 + 1)b
1
C C
C C
C
A
<
N X
i=1
ei
0
B B
B B
B
@
Na + N2
N X
i=1
ci ￿ N(N2 + 1)ci
(N + 1)b
1
C C
C C
C
A
:
N X
i=1
ei
 
N
N X
i=1
ei ￿ (N2 + 1)ei
!
< 0
N2(e)2 < (N2 + 1)e2
￿e2 < N2var(ei)
This proves that aggregate emissions under complete regulation will be strictly less than unregulated
emissions.
Proposition 3.2 :If e0 > e1, the introduction of incomplete environmental regulation can result in a net
increase in overall emissions.
N X
i=1
ei
0
B
B B
B B
@
Na + N2
N X
i=1
(ci + ￿diei) ￿ N(N2 + 1)(ci + ￿diei)
(N2 + 1)b
1
C
C C
C C
A
>
N X
i=1
ei
0
B
B B
B B
@
Na + N2
N X
i+1
ci ￿ N(N2 + 1)ci
(N2 + 1)b
1
C
C C
C C
A
N X
i=1
ei
 
N
N X
i=1
diei ￿ (N2 + 1)(diei)
!
> 0
N2ee1 > (N2 + 1)e2
1
N2
N2 + 1
>
e2
1
e e1
If the exempt ￿rms are su¢ ciently more polluting, this inequality can be satis￿ed.
Proof of Proposition 4.2: If e1 > e0 ; aggregate emissions under complete environmental regulation can
exceed aggregate emissions under incomplete regulation.
This proposition implies the following inequality can hold:
56N X
i=1
ei
0
B
B B
B B
@
Na + N2
N X
i=1
(ci + ￿diei) ￿ N(N2 + 1)(ci + ￿diei)
(N2 + 1)b
1
C
C C
C C
A
<
N X
i=1
ei
0
B
B B
B B
@
Na + N2
N X
i+1
(ci + ￿ei) ￿ N(N2 + 1)(ci + ￿ei)
(N2 + 1)b
1
C
C C
C C
A
N2
N X
i=1
ei
N X
i=1
diei ￿ N2
N X
i=1
ei
N X
i=1
ei < N(N2 + 1)
 
N X
i=1
eidiei ￿
N X
i=1
eiei
!
e2
0
e e0
<
N2
N2 + 1
In order for this inequality to hold, it must be that exempt ￿rms are relatively less polluting. Again, note
that there are situations in which incomplete regu
Appendix 6 : Simulation Methods
The single-stage game
The single-stage Cournot model is modi￿ed to re￿ ect the realities of the California market. Firms￿
marginal costs are now assumed to be increasing with production (versus constant). Unit-level capacity
constraints and transmission constraints are explicitly represented.
Supply curves for the Paci￿c Northwest (i.e. Washington and Oregon) and Southwest (i.e. Arizona,
Nevada, New Mexico, and Utah) are constructed using dependable capacity measures and marginal costs
of all generation located in these states that is not owned by California utilities. Least cost dispatch is
assumed in the PNW and SW regions.45 Generation not required to serve native load is assumed to be
available for export to California, subject to transmission constraints. Transmission capacity is allocated
￿rst to ￿rm imports, and then to the least costly out-of-state generation that is not needed to serve native
load.
The competitive fringe includes all non-strategic instate generation and all non-strategic, out-of-state
generation that can be accommodated by existing transmission capacity. The out-of-state units that help
comprise this fringe vary from hour to hour with loads in neighboring states. In each hour, the residual
45With the exception of Oregon (where the vast majority of generating capacity is hydro), all of the states
surrounding California have elected not to restructure their electricity industries. Consequently, least cost dispatch
in these states is a reasonable assumption.
57demand curve faced by the strategic ￿rms is constructed by subtracting fringe supply from California
demand in that hour.
For each of three policy regimes (i.e. no environmental regulation, complete regulation, and in-
complete regulation) 8784 hourly supply curves are constructed for each of the eleven strategic ￿rms
supplying the California market. The total capacity that the ith ￿rm has available in hour t is comprised
of the in-state generation and ￿rm imports owned by the ￿rm, plus any out-of-state generation owned
by the ￿rm that is not required to supply native load. These generating units are arranged in order of
ascending marginal operating cost to yield a ￿rm-speci￿c, hour-speci￿c step function. For simulations
that assume GHG regulations (complete and incomplete), marginal costs re￿ ect the cost of complying
with the environmental regulation.
A linear function cit(qit) is ￿t to these ￿rm-speci￿c, hour-speci￿c step functions. The vector of
equilibrium production quantities q￿
t = fq1t::::q11tg solves:
max
qit
8
<
:
pst(qit;
N X
j6=i
q￿
jt)qit ￿ cit(qit) ￿ di￿eiqit
9
=
;
;i = 1::11;
subject to unit-level non-negativity constraints, unit-level capacity constraints and transmission con-
straints.
In each hour, I solve iteratively for the Cournot equilibrium. Using the GAUSS eqsolve procedure,
the pro￿t-maximizing output for the ith Cournot supplier is determined conditional on the production of
the other Cournot suppliers.46 For each hour, equilibrium quantities, equilibrium emissions and electricity
prices are recorded for the three regions.
The two-stage game with forward contracts
In the theoretical analysis of the two period model, it was possible to solve for q￿ by substituting q(f)
directly into [11]. In order to make the model more realistic, the simplifying assumption of constant
marginal costs is released. Consequently, it becomes prohibitively di¢ cult to solve explicitly for spot
market production quantities q in terms of the forward positions f .
Fortunately, the explicit function q(f) is not essential to solving the system of ￿rst order conditions
that de￿ne the spot market equilibrium. Note that the system of equations that de￿ne the spot market
46The algorithm begins by solving for the pro￿t-maximizing output of the ￿rst supplier assuming that the other
strategic suppliers do not produce. In the next step, the level of output at the second ￿rm is solved for conditional
on the q1 calculated in the previous step, and assuming that qi = 0 for all i 6= 1;2: The algorithm proceeds,
looping repeatedly through suppliers and solving for pro￿t-maximizing output conditional on the output levels of
other producers calculated in previous iterations. The process continues until no supplier can pro￿t from changing
its output levels given the output of the other strategic producers. Once equilibrium levels of output among the
strategic suppliers have been identi￿ed, the corresponding equilibrium prices and emissions for the hour can be
calculated.
58equilibrium can be rewritten:
pst(Qt)
@qit
@fit
+ qit
@pst
@fit
￿ cit ￿ ￿diei
@qit
@fit
= 0 (20)
The multivariate implicit function theorem allows us to solve for the matrix of partial derivatives q0
t(ft)
without having to explicitly solve for q(f). These partial derivatives can then be substituted into the
system of equations de￿ned by (20).
The hour-speci￿c, ￿rm-speci￿c marginal cost functions Cit(qit) and the residual demand equation
at ￿ bt(
11 X
i=1
qit) discussed in the previous section are also used to parameterize the system of ￿rst order
equations de￿ned by [20]. The same iterative algorithm described in the previous section is used to
solve this system. Equilibrium production at strategic ￿rms q￿
t, fringe ￿rms, aggregate emissions E￿
t and
electricity price p￿
st are computed for each hour.
Perfectly Competitive Spot Markets
Simulations that assume price taking behavior on the part of all electricity producers are carried out
using a very similar approach. Wholesale electricity market outcomes in the Southwest and Paci￿c
Northwest are simulated in precisely the same way as in the simulations based on the single-stage and
two-stage models (i.e. generation not required to serve native load is assumed to be available for export to
California, subject to transmission constraints). The same hourly supply curves used in the simulations
that assume price taking behavior are used to simulate outcomes in a perfectly competitive California
market. All ￿rms are assumed to produce up to the point where marginal cost equals the wholesale
electricity price. In each hour, I iteravely increase the wholesale price until supply equals demand in that
hour.
59Appendix 7 : Releasing the Assumption of Perfectly Inelastic Demand
The simulation models used to generate results presented in the paper assume perfectly inelastic demand.
This assumption is fairly standard in electricity market simulations (Puller, 2007; Kim and Knittel,
2006). Few customers are exposed to time-varying pricing; empirically estimated own-price elasticities
in electricity markets tend to be quite small. However, inasmuch as consumers do exhibit some demand
elasticity, these results will under-estimate the e⁄ects of the policy on industry emissions (because demand
reduction is not accomodated as a possible emissions abatement option).
Newcomer et al., 2008 consider U.S. electricity consumers￿short run response to the introduction of a tax
(or ￿xed permit price). They assume that consumers are exposed to real time electricity price ￿ uctuations.
Holding the level of the carbon tax ￿xed, they simulate emissions reductions for assumed price elasticities
of demand in the range of -0.1 to -0.2. The more elastic demand, the greater the emissions reductions.
In order to investigate how sensitive the simulation results presented in this paper are a⁄ected when
the assumption of perfectly inelastic demand is released, some simulations are conducted that assume a
downward sloping (versus vertical) demand curve. An elasticity of- 0.3 is assumed.
Tables A1 and A2 summarize results for a representative hour in which observed electricity demand was
at average levels in California and surrounding states..California load, net of hydro supply, is 26,675 in
this hour. To run these simulations, California electricity demand is represented by a downward sloping,
linear inverse demand function. The intercept and slope parameters are those which are consistent
with an own-price elasticity of -0.3 at the observed level of electricity consumption and the competitive
equilibrium price under assumptions of inelastic demand ($41.97). Emissions reductions are greater when
demand response is built into the simulation model. Intuitively, this is because emissions reductions can
be achieved through both a re-ordering of the dispatch and demand reductions. Incomplete regulation
achieves a larger percentage of the emissions reductions achieved under complete regulation. Note that
the regulation-induced increase in wholesale electricity price is similar under complete and incomplete
participation. Thus, a signi￿cant fraction of the demand (and associated emissions) reductions induced
by complete regulation is also observed under incomplete regulation.
60Table A1: Summary of Equilibrium Permit Prices and Emissions Under Complete and
Incomplete Regulation for a Representative Hour (One-stage Model)
;
Complete Regulation Incomplete Regulation
Perfectly inelastic Elastic Perfectly inelastic Elastic
demand Demand demand Demand
Average $70.20 $61.40 $68.89 $59.91
California
electricity price
($/MWh)
Net California load (MWh) 26,675 23,588 26,675 23,825
Emissions from generation 4,562 3,543 2331 1,658
located in California
(tons)
Emissions from generation 12,882 11,114 13,230 11,898
serving California load
( tons)
Total emissions 21,884 20,116 23,465 22,133
(million tons CO2)
Total reduction 2,459 4046 878 2,029
(million tons CO2)
Total reduction 10% 17% 4% 8%
(%)
61Table A2: Summary of Equilibrium Permit Prices and Emissions Under Complete and
Incomplete Regulation for a Representative Hour : Competitive Model
Complete Regulation Incomplete Regulation
Perfectly inelastic Elastic Perfectly inelastic Elastic
demand demand demand demand
Average $64.58 $58.73 $60.90 $56.14
California
electricity price
($/MWh)
Net California load 26,675 24,008 26,676 24,420
Emissions from generation 4,985 3,731 2,488 1,965
located in California
(tons)
Emissions from generation 12,746 11,319 13,350 12,247
serving California load
( tons)
Total emissions 21,745 20,321 23,585 22,482
(million tons CO2)
Total reduction 2,558 3,982 718 1,821
(million tons CO2)
Total reduction 11% 16% 3% 7%
(%)
62Appendix 8
Table A3 : Out-of-state Generation owned by California entities
Plant name State Fuel Type Capacity CA Share
(MW) Percent MW
Four Corners NM Coal 2,140 34.6% 740
Intermountain UT Coal 1,810 96% 1,738
Navajo AZ Coal 2,250 21.2% 477
Palo Verde Nuclear 3,867 27.4% 1,060
Reid Gardner NV Coal 595 29.9% 178
San Juan NV Coal 1,647 24.2% 399
Notes : In 2004, California utilities also owned 66% of the Mohave coal plant in Nevada. This plant
was closed in 2005 due to air quality permit compliance issues. This plant is not included in simulation
exercises.
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